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Introduction
The consequences of many policies are complicated and difficult to foresee. To reduce the chances of making wrong decisions, policy makers need information.
Policy makers often lack time and expertise to collect information themselves. For this reason, they have to rely on others. A serious problem is that agents who have information about policy consequences are usually those who have a vested interest in the outcome (Milgrom and Roberts, 1986) . For example, it is very likely that army officers are much better informed about the pros and cons of alternative weapon systems than policy makers. This does not always mean, however, that officers' recommendations concerning weapon systems are in policy makers' interests.
Asymmetric information sometimes implies that those who have the formal authority to take decisions do not always actually take decisions (see Aghion and Tirole, 1997 , on the distinction between formal and real authority). In the public choice literature, it is often argued that informed players, like government bureaucracies and interest groups, have too much influence on policy. An early contribution to this literature is Niskanen (1971) , who argues that bureaucracies are too large, because bureaucrats are better informed than those who are supposed to oversee them (for a survey of this literature, see Mueller, 2003 ).
More recently, scholars have argued that the power of informed parties should not be exaggerated. One argument in this debate revolves around reputation. In general, policy makers and information providers do no meet once, but several times.
An important implication is that the policy maker can punish information providers who have manipulated information. One obvious punishment is firing the adviser. Lupia and McCubbins (1994) , and Wittman (1995) all mention reputational concerns as a reason why information providers may act in line with the principal's interests, but that neither of them actually shows that this is actually the case. Or as Bendor et al. (2001) put it "The preceding was a "free" application of the theory of repeated games to delegation issues." This paper analyzes a simple two-period model of a policy maker (she) and an adviser (he) to identify the conditions under which the policy maker's power to replace her adviser induces the adviser to act (more) in line with her interests. In each period, the policy maker makes a decision on a project, and an adviser gives a recommendation about the project. The policy maker has incomplete information about the adviser's preferences. There are good and bad advisers, in the sense that the preferences of good advisers are closer to the preferences of the policy maker than the preferences of bad advisers. 1 . At the end of period 1, the policy maker can replace her adviser. This power creates reputational concerns. 2 To put a stamp on future policy, an adviser wants to be re-appointed. We show that reputational concerns often induce bad advisers to act more in line with the policy maker's interests. This is the benefit of reputational concerns. However, reputational concerns may induce good advisers to act less in line with the policy maker's interests. This is a cost of reputational concerns. We show that the cost may exceed the benefit. It is even possible that reputational concerns hamper communication. Overall, our analysis shows that the policy maker's power to replace her adviser does not always help her to keep control of her adviser.
Our paper is related to the game-theoretical literature on building and maintaining a reputation. An early contribution to this literature is Kreps and Wilson (1982) , who study a long-run incumbent firm can build a reputation for playing tough against potential entrants. A key feature of their study is that the long-run firm can be tough or weak. In the same spirit, Persson and Tabellini (1990) describe how a central banker can build a reputation for always fighting inflation. They assume that agents have incomplete information about the weight the central banker gives to fighting inflation relative to boosting economic growth. We follow this literature in that incomplete information about an agent's preferences is an essential feature of our model.
In many studies on reputation effects, reputation is good for the long-run player.
However, recently, Ely and Välimäki (2003) show that reputation can be bad. Important for this result is that reputational concerns may lead the good type long-run player to take an action that is harmful for both himself and the short-run player.
The reason for this action is a fear of being perceived as a bad type. 
The Model
We consider a two-period model, t = {1, 2}. In each period, a policy maker has to make a decision on a public project, X t . There are two alternatives: the project is implemented, X t = 1 or the status quo is maintained, X t = 0. An implemented project yields a payoff to the policy maker equal to:
The parameter p denotes the policy maker's predisposition towards the project.
Throughout, we assume that p > 0. 3 The term µ t reflects that the consequences of the project are uncertain. We assume that µ t is drawn from a uniform distribution function with µ t ∈ [−h, h]. Moreover, we assume that µ 1 and µ 2 are independent of each other. We normalize by zero the payoff to the policy maker when she preserves the status quo (U P t (X t = 0) = 0). Clearly, if the policy maker could observe µ t , she would prefer X t = 1 to X t = 0 if µ t > −p. However, we assume that the policy maker does not observe µ t . Since p > 0, without further information about µ t , the policy maker chooses X t = 1. To ensure that our model describes an interesting situation, we assume that p − h < 0. The implication is that without further information about µ t the policy maker runs the risk of making a wrong decision on the project.
In each period the policy maker can hire one adviser. The hired adviser observes µ t . On the basis of the adviser's preferences, a, two types of advisers can be distinguished. The first type is relatively biased towards preserving the status quo. The preferences of advisers of this type are represented by:
Advisers of the second type are relatively biased towards implementation:
with a ≥ a. By normalization, the payoff to any adviser equals zero when the policy maker preserves the status quo. An essential feature of our model is that the policy maker does not know the adviser's type. The prior probability that a = a equals This prior is common knowledge. An adviser knows his own type. Throughout, we assume that the adviser who is relatively biased against implementation is the good adviser from the policy maker's point of view. That is, if the policy maker were able to observe a, she would choose an advisor with a = a. This requires that p < a+a 2
. 3 The analysis of the case that p < 0 is analogous.
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The hired adviser sends a message, m t , about the project to the policy maker.
This message is a recommendation. Two recommendations are possible: m t ∈ {Y, N}, with m t = Y denoting that the adviser recommends X t = 1, and m t = N denoting that the adviser recommends X t = 0. After the policy maker has received her adviser's message, she makes a decision on the project. An important feature of our model is that at the end of period 1, after the policy maker has received the adviser's message, the policy maker can replace her adviser. As in period 1, the probability that a new adviser's preferences are represented by a = a equals 1 2 .
We assume that the replacement decision is made before outcomes are observed, in particular µ 1 . The description of the game is presented as below: Table 1 : The Description of the Game
Players: The policy maker P and an advisor A Period 1
• Nature chooses µ 1 ∈ [−h, h] and a ∈ {a, a}.
• A observes µ 1 , and sends a message m 1 ∈ {Y, N}.
• P observes m 1 and chooses between X 1 = 0 and X 1 = 1.
• P chooses whether to keep her current advisor or to replace him.
Period 2
• Nature chooses µ 2 ∈ [−h, h], and if the adviser of period 1 is replaced, a ∈ {a, a}.
• A observes µ 2 , and sends a message m 2 ∈ {Y, N}.
• P observes m 2 and chooses between X 2 = 0 and X 2 = 1.
• Payoffs are realized.
Payoffs:
A perfect Bayes equilibrium of our game is a set of strategies and posterior beliefs that satisfy the following conditions: 4 (i) In each period t, after observing m t , the policy maker has a belief about the type of adviser who could have sent m t ; (ii) In each period, the decision made by the policy maker is optimal given her beliefs and given the strategies of the two types of advisers; (iii) In each period, the message sent by the adviser is optimal, given his type, and given the policy maker's strategy;
and (iv) Beliefs are updated according to Bayes' rule.
A Simple Case
To illustrate why reputational concerns may hurt the policy maker, we start with analyzing a simple example. We assume that a = 0 and a > h. Our assumption
h.
Advice and policy in period 2
Consider period 2. In period 2, the adviser has no incentive to build a reputation.
Consequently, a bad adviser always recommends implementation, irrespective of µ 2 , and a good adviser recommends implementation if and only if µ 2 > 0. Does the policy maker has an incentive to follow the adviser's recommendation? Suppose that m 2 = Y . Clearly, if the policy maker were to know that a good adviser had sent this message, it would be optimal for her to follow the adviser's recommendation:
If the policy maker were to know that the bad adviser had sent m 2 = Y , implementation would yield a payoff equal to p > 0.
Hence, if m 2 = Y , it is a best response for the policy maker to choose X 2 = 1. Now suppose that m 2 = N . The policy maker infers from m 2 = N that the adviser is the good one, as a bad one would never send m 2 = N. Ignoring the recommendation, that is choosing X 1 = 1, yields a payoff:
h, it is optimal for the policy maker to follow advice. Our assumption that
(a + a) implies that the condition for communication is always satisfied. 4 Our model is a simple cheap-talk game in the spirit of Crawford and Sobel (1982) . It is wellknown that this type of model always has pooling equilibria. In section 3, our focus is on the identification of a separating equilibrium if such an equilibrium exists. In Section 4, we argue that pooling equilibria are implausible if a separating equilibrium exists.
The replacement decision
At the end of period 1, the policy maker can replace her adviser. Below we will show that if m 1 = N in a communicative equilibrium, then the probability that the adviser is good is higher than the probability that the adviser is bad. In contrast, if m 1 = Y , then the probability that the adviser is bad is higher than the probability that he is good. A direct implication is that in a communicative equilibrium, the policy maker keeps her adviser if and only if m 1 = N.
Advice and policy in period 1
Let us now analyze policy advice in period 1. Suppose that the policy maker follows the adviser's recommendation. Later we will check whether it is optimal for the policy maker to do so. 
Equation (1) implies that if a < 7 6 h, then for some values of µ 1 the bad adviser recommends against implementation. This is the benefit of reputational concerns.
The desire to determine future policy induces a bad adviser to behave more in accordance with the policy maker's interest. If a ≥ h. Hence, reputational concerns induce a good adviser to recommend against implementation for a wider range of parameters. Since we assume that p > 0, this is a cost of reputational concerns.
The communication condition
So far we have assumed that the policy maker follows the adviser's recommendation.
Let us now determine under which conditions this assumption is warranted. Consider first the case that the bad adviser never recommends status quo, a > 7 6 h. Then, conditional on m 1 = N, the policy maker's payoff equals p + 1 2
The condition for communication requires that this expression is negative, implying p < 7 16 h. Recall that without reputational concerns the condition for communication
h. Hence, in the case that a > h. For example suppose that a = h. From (1) we know that then the bad adviser recommends against implementation if µ 1 < − 7 8 h.
The expected value of µ 1 , conditional on m 1 = N equals:
The implication is that the communication condition is satisfied if p <
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h. Thus, also in this case the communication constraint is more restrictive with reputational concerns than without.
Does the policy maker benefit?
Does the policy maker benefit from her power to replace her adviser in our current example? Above we have shown that in our example reputational concerns may jeopardize communication. It is evident that in case communication is hampered because of reputational concerns, reputational concerns make the policy maker worse off. Suppose that reputational concerns do not make communication impossible. In a static model (or in period 2), ex ante the policy maker's payoff would be:
If a > 7 6 h, then the policy maker's payoff in period 1 equals:
It is easy to verify that the expression in (2) exceeds the expression in (3). To understand why, recall that in case a > 7 6 h, reputational concerns do not affect the behavior of the bad adviser and induce the good adviser to recommend status quo more often. Since p > a = 0, the good adviser recommends the status quo too frequently from the policy maker's point of view, even in the absence of reputational concerns. Reputational concerns thus make things worse. Thus, if a > 7 6 h, then the power of the policy maker to replace her adviser does not discipline him. On the contrary, in expectations, recommendations are less in line with the policy maker's interest. Of course, an advantage of the power to replace the adviser is a higher probability that the adviser is good in period 2.
Now suppose that a < 7 6 h. Then, in period 1, the policy maker's payoff equals:
A comparison between (2) and (4) shows that if p > 7 16 h, reputational concerns make the policy maker better off in period 1. Now reputational concerns lead the bad adviser to behave more in line with the policy maker's interest.
The More General Model
We now turn to the more general case that p > 0, p < a < h, and a < a.
Equilibrium in the Second Period Game
At the beginning of the second period, the adviser has a commonly known reputation. Let θ denote the probability that a = a. Notice that if at the end of period 1 a new adviser is hired, then θ = The second period game is a cheap talk game. In cheap talk games, there always exist pooling equilibria. For example, if the adviser always sends m 2 = N, the best response for the policy maker is to ignore the adviser's message. Given this response, the adviser has no incentive to deviate from the strategy "always send m 2 = N". Below, we will argue that if apart from pooling equilibria, a separating equilibrium exists, the pooling equilibria are implausible. However, we first identify the conditions under which a separating equilibrium exists.
Suppose that the policy maker follows her adviser's message. In period 2 an adviser has no incentive to protect his reputation. As a consequence, he only con- 
The expected value of µ 2 , conditional on m 2 = Y , equals (h + a) < 0. Hence, if it is optimal for the policy maker to follow a good adviser's recommendation, then it is also optimal for her to follow advice if she does not know the type of adviser. The reason for this result is that relative to a good adviser, a bad adviser is less likely to recommend
If the condition for communication is satisfied, then the players' strategies described above, and the beliefs (5) and (6) form a separating equilibrium of the second period game. Apart from this one, there exists a separating equilibrium in which m 2 = N serves as a recommendation for X 2 = 1 and m 2 = Y serves as a recommendation for X 2 = 0. However, if we assume a natural language, then the separating equilibrium derived above is the unique separating one. Given that the policy maker does not ignore the adviser's message with a positive probability, it is a best response for the adviser to recommend the project if and only if he prefers X 2 = 1 to X 2 = 0. If the condition for communication is satisfied, then following advice is the best response for the policy maker.
Is there any reason to believe that a separating equilibrium is more likely to occur than a pooling equilibrium, provided that both equilibria exist? To answer this question, note that in a pooling equilibrium, the adviser is indifferent between sending an informative message and sending an uninformative message. Furthermore, note that the adviser and the policy maker both prefer a separating equilibrium to a pooling one. This means that if a separating equilibrium exists, the adviser can ensure it by sending an informative message and telling the policy maker that he has sent an informative message. Then, the best response for the policy maker is to follow the adviser's recommendation. Thus, if in our game the condition for communication is satisfied, then the pooling equilibrium is not renegotiation-proof.
Equilibrium in the Period 1 Game
Throughout this subsection, we assume that in the second period game the policy maker follows her adviser's recommendation, and that the adviser recommends the project if and only if the project payoff to him exceeds zero.
The first period game is identical to the second period game except that the adviser has a reputation to protect. Again, pooling equilibria exist. However, as before, it can be argued that, if apart from the pooling equilibria, a separating equilibrium exists, then the pooling equilibria are not renegotiation-proof. For this reason, we focus on the conditions for the existence of a separating equilibrium.
At the end of the first period, the policy maker can replace her adviser. Below we will show that in a separating equilibrium a bad adviser is more likely to send m 1 = Y than a good adviser. A direct implication is that the policy maker replaces her adviser if and only if m 1 = Y .
Suppose that in period 1 the policy maker chooses to follow advice. Consider a bad adviser who observes µ 1 . Then, sending m 1 = Y yields an expected payoff to the bad adviser equal to:
The last term in (7) shows that by sending m 1 = Y , the bad adviser anticipates that in period 2 policy will be based with probability 1 2 on a good adviser's recommendation, and with probability 1 2 on a bad adviser's recommendation. Sending m 1 = N yields an expected payoff to the bad adviser equal to:
Straightforward algebra shows that (7) is greater than (8) if:
Equation (9) 
Equation (10) implies that the desire to determine future policy also induces the good adviser to send m 2 = N for a wider range of parameters. Figure 1 below diagrammatically describes our situation. 
Since the policy maker prefers a good adviser to a bad one, she strictly prefers to keep her adviser if m 1 = N . Moreover, she prefers to replace her adviser if m 1 = Y .
Hence, given the strategies of the two types of advisers discussed above and (11), it is a best response for the policy maker to keep her adviser if and only if m 1 = N. (9) and (10), one can verify that:
Differentiating (12) 
Are Reputational Concerns Always Good?
So far, our analysis has illuminated three effects of allowing the policy maker to replace her adviser. First, it induces a bad adviser to send m 1 = N more frequently.
Because a bad adviser sends m 1 = Y too frequently from the policy maker's point of view, this effect is good for the policy maker. Second, reputational concerns also lead a good adviser to send m 1 = Y for a wider range of µ 1 . If a < p, this is bad for the policy maker. Finally, the policy maker's ability to replace her adviser may increase the probability that in period 2 the adviser is good. This selection effect is also good for the policy maker.
We now arrive at the main result of the paper: the policy maker may suffer from her power to replace her adviser. To make this point, we compare the policy maker's utility in case she can replace her adviser with her utility when she plays the secondperiod game (with θ = can write the payoff to the policy maker in period 1 as:
with z = 1 8h
(a − a) 2 . Without reputational concerns, the policy maker's payoff would be equal to (13) with z = 0. Hence, in period 1 the policy maker benefits from reputational concerns if:
If p > a+a, then the right-hand side of (14) is negative. Since, z ≥ 0, the implication is that in this situation the policy maker suffers from reputational concerns in period 1. The reason is that if p > a + a, then without reputational concerns X 1 = 0 is recommended too frequently. Consequently, reputational concerns are bad, because they induce advisers to recommend X 1 = 0 even more frequently. If the adverse effects of reputational concerns dominate the positive selection effect, then the policy maker suffers from reputational concerns. The following proposition presents our main result.
Proposition 1
The policy maker may suffer from her power to replace her adviser.
An implication of the above proposition is that the policy maker would like to commit herself either (i) to keeping her adviser or (ii) to always replacing her adviser.
Conclusions
We have analyzed a simple two-period model of a policy maker and an adviser to show that the policy maker's power to replace her adviser may harm the policy maker. On the one hand, the fear of being replaced induces a bad adviser to act more in line with the policy maker's interests. On the other hand, the policy maker's power to replace her adviser may lead a good adviser to act less in line with the policy maker's interests. We show that the latter effect may dominate the former.
Moreover, the latter effect may induce the policy maker to ignore policy advice.
When reputational concerns are bad, the policy maker benefits from committing herself to always keeping her adviser.
Our results are derived from a model that is based on several restrictive assumptions. Let us briefly discuss two of them. One important assumption is that the policy maker could only consult one adviser. If the policy maker were able to consult more advisers, a comparison of the various recommendations could reveal information about the advisers' types. This may have important qualitative implications for our results. Second, in our model information collection is exogenous.
Dur and Swank (forthcoming) show that advisers who are biased neither towards status quo nor towards implementation put most effort in collecting information.
We conjecture that reputation effects weaken an adviser's incentive to collect information. The reason is that the desire to put a stamp on future policy induces an adviser to make less use of information. This reduces the benefits of information, and in turn leads an adviser to put less effort in collecting information.
